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ABSTRACT 
The present (1966) state in the rapidly expanding technology for the 
implementation of a planetary quarantine policy is summarized. The present 
status of NASA's sterilization policy and philosophy, as established by the 
Office of Space Science and Administration, is discussed. 
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STERILIZATION OF UNMANNED PLANETARY SPACECRAFT 
A REPORT ON CURRENT TECHNOLOGY
 
SUMMARY
 
The overall philosophy of spacecraft sterilization is discussed, and the 
present state of the art of NASA policy is presented. Biological considerations 
necessary for the implementation of a planetary quarantine policy are outlined, 
and facilities and sterilization methods are discussed. 
The sterilization considerations required at each stage in the planning
of a mission are discussed, and the present status of technological develop­
ment in each phase of mission programming is presented, with special em­
phasis on problem areas and those which need further definition. 
It is concluded that the successful implementation of a planetary qua­
rantine policy is possible, but it will require maximum effort in every phase
of mission planning. The greatest obstacle in obtaining this goal is seen to be 
the potential loss of flexibility caused by the rapid simultaneous expansion of 
policy and technology. 
INTRODUCTION 
For many reasons, including consideration of the philosophical impli­
cations of contaminating another planet, the primary objectives of planetary
exploration require that planetary landers be devoid of contaminating materials 
which are part of the earth environment. Interplanetary investigations offer 
unique opportunities for obtaining information about the origin of life and its 
evolution which could be destroyed once and for all by the accidental intro­
duction of viable terrestrial organisms into planetary atmospheres in which 
they could grow and which may contain no natural controls. It has been esti­
mated [i] that one bacteria with a replication time of 30 days would increase 
to equal the bacterial population of earth in merely 8 years. 
Ideally, investigation of other planets could be performed without 
introducing any chemical cdmpounds at l;.or at least without organic com­
pounds, for evolutional theory is now concerned with molecular evolution. 
Because there exists the high probability that earth bacteria could live in 
and contaminate planetary environments [i] and because there is a lack of 
knowledge and experimental technology to study possible life forms or other 
contamination mechanisms smaller than bacteria (e.g. viruses), an inter­
natibnal planetary quarantine policy which requires that planetary landers 
be sterile with respect to viable bacterial species has been adopted. 
The development and implementation of a sterilization policy is of 
high priority in planning interplanetary missions. This effort involves the 
development of specific requirements and of techniques for their imple­
mentation. 
The purpose of this report is to examine the present status of poli­
cies and requirements, and to summarize briefly the technological status 
of the sterilization aspect of interplanetary missions currently in the develop­
mental stages. Particular emphasis will be placed on the problem areas 
which need further definition. 
STERI LIZATION REQUIREMENTS FOR PLANETARY EXPLORATION 
The theoretical requirement for sterility implies that there are 
absolutely no viable microorganisms on or in a planetary lander, since 
this is the only stable state with respect to biological contamination. How­
ever, methods of sampling and analysis require that this be expressed as 
a low but finite probability that a planet will be contaminated as a result 
of a space mission. Because of the difficulties of analysis and the nature of 
the property being measured, sterility assurance must be based not entirely 
on physical measurements, but on a concept of certified sterility. This is 
the definition of a sufficient set of principles which, if followed, give an 
acceptable level of assurance that the level and type of contamination does 
not exceed a certain value. Implementation of this principle demands 
consideration of sterility in planning, engineering and fabrication throughout 
all phases of the mission. 
2 
Current NASA policy for carrying out these requirements is as follows
 
[2]:
 
i. "Lander will be assembled in clean rooms at specified levels of
 
assembly.
 
2. "Landing-assembly will be subjected to an approved sterilization 
procedure.
 
3. "The landing assembly will be enclosed in a bacteriological barrier 
to maintain cleanliness and sterility. After [sterilization] the enclosure will 
not be opened within any portion of the earth's atmosphere which might re­
cbntaminate the landing assembly." 
Although the original maximum permitted probability of an organism
4
surviving terminal sterilization was i0- , refinement of the analytical methods 
is continually being done. For example, the inclusion of a term other than 
3 -2

unity (.i-ito 10 ) for the probability of a lone survivor being released on 
the planetary surface and spreading has allowed an increase of maximum lander 
contamination to iO - 3 [3]. The details of the mathematics involved in arriving 
at allowable contamination probabilities can be found in Sagan and Coleman, 
Schalhowsky and Light [4, 5, 6]. 
The following probabilities for the various mission phases have been 
proposed by Jet Propulsion Laboratory and are under consideration by NASA 
[7]:
 
"On any unmanned flight of a vehicle to.the planet Mars, be it a lander, 
orbiter, flyby or some combination of these, the following must be fulfilled: 
I. "The probability of an accidental planetary impact of any highly
-5 
contamination part thereof shall not exceed 3 x i0 per flight. For the 
purpose of this constraint, 'highly contaminated' shall refer to any vehicle 
2
or part thereof which carries more than 10 viable organisms. 
2. " The probability of the release of a viable organism on the 
planetary surface or in the planetary atmosphere from all other sources of 
-3 

contamination shall not exceed i x i0 per flight. 
3. "For any source of contamination that continues to act over long 
periods of time, such as an unsterile orbiter, the above constraints shall 
apply to all potential contaminations up to and including the year 2000. 
3 
4. "The numerical constraints shall be sub-allocated to the individual 
contamination sources by the agency or agencies responsible for the mission
 
design and operation."
 
"Using these constraints and a requirement of 99. 9 percent 6onfidence 
that the unmanned exploration of Mars will not contaminate the planet with 
terrestrial organisms, calculations have yielded an overall probability of con­
-tamination value of i. 015 x 10 3 for the unmanned program." 
The planning of the Voyager mission around the outline of clean assem­
bly, terminal sterilization by heat and enclosure in a barrier which then re­
mains sealed, is well underway and will be covered in this report. It should 
be emphasized that the outline itself is subject to cricitism, however, and it 
is susceptable to alteration or replacement as technology and experience are 
gained. 
One example of a possible alternative to this outline is the suggestion 
by Fisher [8] that terminal inflight sterilization inside a lightweight deploy­
able canister is feasible. The advantages of this approach, such as the elim­
ination of elaborate ground facilities for sterility maintenance after sterili­
zation and the long flight time available for a sterilization cycle, make this 
a concept worth consideration. 
Schalkowsky discusses the approximate values used in calculating the 
probabilities of contamination [5]. He suggests that with different but equally 
valid approximations the required contamination probability could be achieved 
with a small increase in terminal sterilization, without the need of a .low 
presterilization bioload, and thus it may be possible to eliminate the costly 
use of clean assembly methods. This criticism -is presented more as an illus­
tration of the methods and approximations involved and the need of further 
evaluation than as a specific suggestion. Present development of sterilization 
technology is toward increasingly Low presterilization'bioload, and continued 
reduction in.heat soak duration. 
4 
BIOLOGI CAL CONS IDERATIONS 
Introduction 
The bacteria are the smallest living organisms (0. 2 to 10. 0 microns)
about which much knowledge has been accumulated. Viruses are smaller,
but little is known about the conditions which govern their ability to live in 
their hosts, although it is thought that they are not autonomous. For that 
matter, it is possible that there are other smaller "life" forms as yet unknown 
to man. Thus, the most resistant bacterial'forms, the mesophilic spore 
formers, have been chosen as criteria sterility assurance. 
To best explain the death of bacterial populations under exposure to 
lethal conditions is to say that it is governed by an exponential law, i.e., a 
constant time interval results in the reduction of the population by a constant 
fraction. The term "D-Value" refers to the time required for a 90 percent
population reduction, and "Z-Value" refers to the slope of the die-off curve. 
The D-Value is characteristic of the organism, the sterilizing condition and 
the environment of the organism. The exponential law implies theoretically 
that zero can never be reached; thus a calculated population of less than one, 
-
e.g. 10 4, is expressed as the probability of one organism surviving. FigureI shows an extrapolated plot of population expressed exponentially versus time 
on a linear scale [ 9]. 
The deviation shown represents the difficulty in enumerating at low 
levels, and has contributed to criticism of the plot itself. The criticism has 
been made that since the problem involved is that of defining the chances of 
the last spore surviving, and this plot depends on a random die-off and a ran­
dom distribution of physiological states and resistances, a better approxi­
mation could be made using extreme-value statistical analysis [0]. Current 
research for the most part supports the validity of the exponential represen­
tation, and it will be used until another method is shown to be better. 
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Sterilization Methods 
I. Physical. - To meet the requirement of sterility, the internal por­
tions of components and materials as well as the surfaces must be sterile.
 
This requires a sterilizing agent which penetrates 
to the interiors of materials. 
Gamma radiation is effective in penetrating and killing ability, but it
is expensive, dangerous and more destructive to materials than heat [i].
 
However, the effects of radiation are of a different nature than those of heat,

and Barrett and Cooley [ii] report that failure mechanisms activated by
radiation are different from those acting during a flight mission; thus radia­
tion sterilization could possibly give higher mission reliability than heat. 
Another.advantage would be the elimination of the weight penalty imposed in 
heat sterilization due to gas pressure, etc. Barrett and Cooley [ii], in a 
study of the feasibility of using radiation for sterilization, report that steril­
ization by radiation is feasible and that cost is the only major disadvantage 
compared to heat. Further knowledge of doses, kill rates and material 
effects, and the development of application methods and radiation resistant 
components and materials will be necessary before this can become a use­
ful tool. The combined use of heat and radiation may prove to be advantageous
 
also.
 
Isolation of a part will allow many organisms to die off, if no nutrient 
is present. This requires a long time, however, and some materials can be 
nutrients to bacteria; thus, this procedure is used only as a supplement to 
other decontamination methods. It has been shown [12] that vacuum condi­
tions such as are found in space are not lethal to spores. 
Another possibility is the use of ultrasonics, but very little work has 
been done in this area to date. 
Dry heat is the best and most understood method, and the only one 
currently approved by NASA. It has the advantages of penetration and easy 
measurement, as well as relatively large accumulation of death-rate in­
formation. The main disadvantages of heat include itsdegradation of com­
ponents and materials and the stresses caused by thermal gradients and 
increased pressures during heating. Because of these factors, sterilization 
cycles are calculated on the basis of only one heating. This presents addi­
tional problems, but it is felt that these are not insurmountable. The anoroach 
being taken is one of developing components and materials that are able to 
withstand sterilization temperatures, and studies are underway to devise 
methods to protect presterilized heat-sensitive components during the heat 
soak [±3].
 
2. Chemical. - Chemical methods are only good for surface decon­
tamination and are used for the reduction of the bioload before terminal steril­
ization. 
Liquid decontaminants include phenol, lysol, quaternary compounds, 
hypochlorite, caustic sodium hydroxide and formalin; 5 percent ethylene 
oxide in methanol is reported to be an especially good liquid sterilant [14]. 
In general, liquid decontaminants are rather undependable because their 
effectiveness depends on the donditions and techniques of application, for 
example, temperature, time and pH. 
Gaseous chemical sterilants are generally more effective, although 
many gaseous as well as liquid decontaminants are corrosive to materials. 
Among those that have been considered are f6rmaldehyde, beta-propiolactone, 
peracetic acid, methyl bromide, propylene oxide and ethylene oxide. 
Ethylene oxide. has been found to be quite useful. It is explosive and 
highly toxic, but in the mixture 12 percent ethylene oxide and 88 percent 
Freon-i2 (CF 2CI2) by weight (ETO-Fi2), it is nonexplosive, is effective at 
room temperatures and low humidities, has high penetrating powers and 
relatively low toxicity, is not corrosive to most materials, leaves no residue 
and is easily purged. The ETO-Fi2 mixture is an efficient sterilant or 
decontaminant and has been chosen as the main chemical method to be used 
for surface decontamination. Its main disadvantage is that it requires a 
relatively long time period. Beta-propiolactone is less penetrating, has 
a higher toxicity and may be carcinogenic; however, it requires less time 
and may be used in special cases when ETO-Fi2 concentrations cannot be 
maintained [15]. Propylene oxide is slower acting than ETO-Fi2, but 
less toxic; methyl bromide is only one tenth as effective as ETO-Fi2; 
formaldehyde leaves a messy residue [16]. 
The Russians reported at the 1966 COSPAR meeting in Vienna that 
they use a mixture of 60 percent ethylene oxide and 40 percent methyl bro­
mide by volume for terminal sterilization. (They accomplish internal steril­
ization by sterilizing by heat all components at some stage in the assembly.) 
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They report that this mixture has high penetrating power and does not alter 
the properties of plastics or rubber or influence the functioning of radios or 
electric components [17]. This mixture will probably be re-examined in this 
country. (Preliminary plans for an international conference on sterilization 
in London July ±967 has been endorsed by COSPAR and NASA officials). 
3. Filtration. - Filters that are capable of screening out microbial­
sized particles have been developed. Decker and Buchanan [18] report an 
evaluation made of various types of filters using bacterial particles i to 5 
microns in diameter, in which the-filters were placed in classes according to 
efficiency. The highest efficiency was 99. 999999 percent. This study was 
oriented toward air filtration but they state that satisfactory filtration of liquids 
can be achieved. The Russians reported sterilizing liquids by filtering through 
asbestos filters [17]. Further investigation of filters to be considered for 
sterilization is being done by the Wilmot Castle Company under Contract to 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory [19]. 
4. Use of Sporicidal Materials. - Various polymeric materials and 
fuels have been and are being investigated for toxicity [19, 20, 21]. Some of 
the problems presented by Opfell and Bandaruk [20] in the assurance of internal 
sterility (see discussion of sampling method) may challenge some of the find­
ings of these reports. The approach of producing self-sterilizing materials is 
a good one, however, especially for materials which are overly degraded by 
heat sterilization. Further development in this area appears to be warranted. 
5. Current Status of Approved Sterilization and Decontamination 
Methods. - The only NASA approved means of terminal sterilization is the use 
of dry heat. The first twelve cycles listed in Table I are those approved by 
NASA on the basis of the "worst case" approximations of an initial bioload of 
108 viable organisms (mesophilic bacterial spores in soil), undergoing a twelve 
- 4log reduction to t0 organisms [22]. The last cycle listed is a recently 
approved [23] cycle for Voyager which is the result of refinements in the 
methods and approximations used. This D-Value is based on spores embedded 
in plastic, and the length of the cycle is based on an initial population of 105 
- 3.spores to be reduced to ±0 This initial population assumption is the result 
of improved, techniques of achieving and estimating the feasible presterili­
zation bioload [3]. Further reductions as the result of continuing research on 
D-Values and Z-Values are expected. NASA approved heat decontamination 
cycles are given in Tables II and III. 
There is hope that Ethylene Oxide-Freon F12 will be authorized for 
limited sterilization use at some future time. It is currently approved for 
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TABLE I. APPROVED STERILIZATION CYCLES 
Temperature D-Values Sterilization 
(C C) (Hours) Time (hours) 
105 28.0 336 
1i0 17.5 210 
115 11.0 132 
i20 7.0 84 
125 4.4 53 
130 2.8 34 
35 i.8 22 
140 1, 1 14 
145 0.73 9­
150 0.46 6 
155 0.31 4 
160 0.21 3 
(Based on heterogenous mesophilin bacterial spores in soil, initial 
-population = 108, final population = 10 ' [22] ). 
125 1 3.5 - 24.5 
(New cycle based on spores in plastic, initial population iO5, final 
population 10 - 3 [23] ). 
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TABLE II. DECONTAMINATION HEAT CYCLES FOR ASSAYABLE ITEMS 
Temperature D-Value Minimum(0C ) (hours) * Time ( hours) 
i00 30.0 
 120.0
 
110 12.0 48.0
 
120 4.5 18.0 
130 1.7 7.0 
135 1.0 4.0
 
145 0.38 1.5 
155 0.14 0.6 
160 0.09 0.4
 
* Based on thermal death-time curve (with extrapolations) for spores of 
Bacillus subtilis var. niger embedded in plastics. 
surface decontamination before sterilization. Ethylene Oxide-Freon F12 sur­
face decontamination consists of not less than 72 hours exposure to 35 percent 
relative humidity, followed exposure to not less than 300 milligrams per liter 
ethylene oxide for not less than 4 hours at 21o C (70 ° F) [22]. 
Radiation sterilization approval may be granted in special cases by the 
Planetary Quarantine Office and the Director of Lunar and Planetary Programs. 
Applications for this approval must include proof of need for radiation steril­
ization, proof that its use will not result in contamination of the entire system 
and proof that spacecraft reliability will not be compromised [22]. 
Insertion of sterilized parts and components will not be permitted unless 
it can be proved that the specific procedure has a probability of contaminating 
the spacecraft equal'to or less than 10 - 4 [22]. The main problem here is the 
lack of sufficient technology to develop a reliable sterile insertion procedure. 
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TABLE I. DECONTAMINATION HEAT CYCLES FOR NONASSAYABLE ITEMS 
Temperature 
(C) 
105 

ilO 

115 

120 

125 

130 

135 

140 

145 

150 

155 

i60 

* Based on spores in soil. 
D-Value* 
(hours) 
28.0 
17.5 

1. 0 
7.0 
4.4 
2.8 
1. 8 
1. 
0.73 
0.46 
0.31 

0.21 

Minimum
 
Time (hours)
 
280.0 
175.0 
i±O.0
 
70.0 
44.0 
28.0 
18.0 
1. 0
 
7.3 
4.6 
3. 1 
2.1 
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Sampling Methods 
1. Culturing. 7 The best method of detecting biological contamination 
is culturing; other methods do not distinguish between living and dead cellular 
material. NASA has recently (1 June 1966) published a document [241- which
 
covers present sampling requirements and detailed methods. 
 A list of proce­
dure titles is as follows:
 
a. Assessment of the Microbial Contamination of the Intramural 
Environment of Space Hardware Assembly, Test, and Launch 
Facilities. 
b. Assessment of Microbial Contamination on and within Space 
Hardware.
 
c. 	 Assessment of Microbial Contamination Deposited on Space 
Hardware Handled by Technical Personnel. 
General Electric has been contracted by NASA to issue "Procedures 
Manual for Planetary Spacecraft to be Sterilized by Heating, Volume III, Bio­
logical Handbook," which will familiarize engineers and other technical per­
sonnel with biological concepts [±4, 25]. 
Culturing, although it is the best method of sampling, has limitations. 
Incubation requires time and it only measures reproducing organisms. There 
is no absolute certainty that an organism in its preferred medium will reproduce.
Culturing does not distinguish between dormant and dead organisms, and it is 
not known under what conditions a dormant microorganism will produce again. 
Also, there is always the danger that organisms are killed during the sampling 
process, or that extraneous contamination is introduced. 
The recovery of microorganisms from surfaces for culturing is accomp­
lished by swabbing or Rodac plating, which are standard microbiological tech­
niques; the recovery of organisms from solids is more difficult and has the 
additional disadvantage that materials must be destroyed to be tested. It has 
been reported by Opfell and Bandaruk [20] that test sensitivity for solids is 
more dependent on the surface and material being tested than other single param­
eter. In some solids they were unable to detect innoculums of as many as 106 
spores per cubic centimeter. Recovery of microorganisms from solid materials 
is accomplished by slicing, pulverizing [24], or dissolving. The recovery 
i3
 
depends in part on the method used . Each of these methods may damage or 
poison certain microorganisms. Bacteriostasis, which would be interpreted 
by present methods as sterility, can result from contact of media with tested 
material, contact of the organisms with tested material or preservatives in 
the material (e. g. , in polymeric materials). 
Further development of specified [24] and alternative culturing proce­
dures, especially for solids, will be necessary to facilitate biological monitor­
ing and make it more dependable. Techniques must be approved and refined 
so that tests will apply to all potentially viable organisms, rather than just the 
uninjured, nondormant and easily removable ones. Appropriate media for all 
possible contaminants need further definition. Developmental work in the de­
tection of contamination in solids has been and is being done by the Dynamic 
Science Corporation under contract to Jet Propulsion Laboratory [19]. 
For future developments it is suggested in Opfell and Bandaruk [20] that 
automated techniques for searching solid materials may be possible using life 
detection techniques developed for planetary missions. -These rather insensi­
tive tests could be made more sensitive by utilizing the extensive knowledge of 
the earth environment as opposed to the postulated Martian environment. Another 
possibility is the detection of injected fluorescent antibodies corresponding to 
the particular test organism. 
The current state of technology in biological sampling of materials does 
not justify interpreting negative tests as meaningful, and, fortunately, sterility 
assurance is based on other factors as well. Sampling of the processes by which 
components are manufactured, packaged and sterilized is more reliable than 
sampling of components themselves. For complete sterility assurance it is 
necessary to study the complete manufacturing history of components and mate­
rials. 
2. Sterility Indicators. - Another basic technique for sterility testing 
is the use of indicators during the sterilization process. These include temper­
ature indicators for heat sterilization, isotope counters for radiation sterili­
zation and chemical indicators to measure ETO concentrations. A summary of 
sterility indicators is given in Table IV [14]. The best and most direct method, 
however, is the use of spore strips. These are hermetically se4led tablets 
which contain a specified spore population greater than that on the lander. After 
the sterilization process, these are broken open and cultured. The Wilmot 
Castle Company under contract ot Jet Propulsion Laboratory is working on de­
veloping improved and standardized indicators [19]. 
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TABLE IV. STERILITY INDICATORS
 
Sterilization Property Being
 
Method Indicator Measured
 
Dry or Moist Heat Thermometer Temperature 
Thermocouple 
Temperature Sensitive 
Paints, Labels, Crayons, 
Ampules 
Bacterial Spore Strips, Viability 
Ampules, Packets 
ETO-F12 Chemical Indicators 	 ETO-Fi2 Con­
centration 
Spore Strips 	 Viability 
Bioclean Facilities 
i. Introduction. - Bioclean facilities may be defined as enclosed areas 
employing control over viable and nonviable particulate matter in air with tem­
perature, humidity and pressure control as required. This includes both glove 
boxes and bioclean rooms. Several studies and experiments have been done on 
the use of both. The following paragraphs provide brief summaries and descrip­
tions accompanied by the most current and comprehensive references to detailed 
information. 
2. Glove Boxes. - uiove Boxes are small enclosures in which operations 
are performed by workers who are out side the enclosure and do their work with 
gloves attached to the walls of the enclosure. Studies of these with respect to 
cost and load reduction efficiency have been done by Lockheed [26] and General 
Electric [27]. 
3. Bioclean Rooms. 
a. Specifications. A new document, "Standard Bioclean Room and 
Work Station Requirements for the Microbiologically Controlled Environment" 
[28], will replace the 1963 NASA "Interim Requirements for Bioclean Facili­
ties." Table V shows the requirements from this document. NASA sterilization 
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TABLE V. BIOCLEAN ROOM REQUIREMENTS 
Maximum Number Maximum Number of Maximum Number of 
of Particles per Viable Particles per Particles 5 MicronLiter (per cubic Liter (per cubic foot) and Larger per liter 
foot) per cubic foot) 
100 3.5 8. 0035 
(100) (0. 1) 
i0 000 350 0.35 2.3
 
(io 000) (iO) (65)
 
i00 000 3500 3.5 25
 
(100 000) (00) (700)
 
guidelines now specify the use of class 100 laminar downflow clean rooms ac­
cording to Fed. Std.209 [29] for control of biological contamination on plane­
tary landers [22]. 
Although there is a close connection between particulate and viable con­
tamination, they are not necessarily synonymous. Investigations are underway 
to determine what measures are necessary to obtain desired levels of micro­
bial contamination. it is possible that methods other than, and less expensive 
than, laminar downflow will be found adequate to meet microbiological require­
ment. 
For example, General Electric investigated several flexible-walled non ­
laminar clean rooms to determine whether this was a possible alternative to 
laminar flow rooms [27,30]. Two particular enclosures at General Electric 
were examined; enclosure A is 13.7 by 4.6 meters (45 by 15 feet), with air 
flow of 3 to 4. 5 meters (10 to 15 feet) per minute, and enclosure B is 3.7 by 
4.25 by 2.4 meters (12 by 14 by 8 feet) with an air flow of 15.25 meters 
(50 feet) per-minute. They found that enclosure A met the specifications 
of a class 5000 to 10 000 clean room and enclosure B met the specifications 
of a'class 100 clean room. Both enclosures meet the microbial specifications 
of not more than 3.6 viable particles per cubic meter ( 0. 1 viable particles per 
cubic foot) of air. They recommend that further studies be done toward a 
possible relaxation of the class 100 laminar flow room requirement. 
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Costs and efficiency will play a large part in the choice of assembly 
methods. NASA is presently in the process of examining various clean rooms 
to determine which ones are suitable or could be made suitable for bioclean 
assembly. It is recommended [27] that types of clean rooms other than 
rigid laminar downflow rooms be considered. 
b. Monitoring. Careful monitoring is necessary to insure that 
low microbial levels are maintained and specified procedural precautions are 
strictly adhered to. 
In Jet Propulsion Laboratory's Experimental Assembly and Sterili­
zation Laboratory (EASL) [31 ], a Royco particle counter was used to mon­
itor particulate air contamination, a Reniers slit sampler was used for micro­
bial air sampling, stainless steel settling strips were used for measuring 
microbial fallout and procedural monitoring was done by visual and camera 
surveillance. They report that the steel strips were very satisfactory, but 
that both air monitoring methods had the disadvantage of taking such small 
samples that it was questionable whether they could be said to be representa­
tive of the room air. Particulate monitoring methods have been investigated 
by the Martin Company [32] and others [33,34], and the microbial monitoring 
is continually being studied (see discussion of biological monitoring in the 
third section of this report). 
c. Personnel. It is agreed that microbial contamination of clean 
rooms is a function of the number and activity of the personnel in the room 
[35]. Much researchhas been and is being done, and all aspects of personnel 
activities, dress, entrance and egress, health and monitoring are being in­
vestigated. A detailed recapitulation of the information obtained is beyond 
the scope of this report. The most comprehensive and complete information 
can be found in the General Electric Final Report [27], Section ii. It is 
evident that extensive and cosly modifications of conventional clean room 
operations are necessary. 
d. Existing Facilities. Jet Propulsion Laboratory has built 
an Experimental Assembly and Sterilization Laboratory (EASL). The facil­
ity is based on (I) laminar downflow, (2) small positive pressure gradient, 
(3) decontamination of all parts, etc., entering the facility and (4) rigorous 
personnel cleanliness techniques. The floor plan, showing sampling locations, 
is given in Figure 2. The objectives specified for the EASL effort were as 
follows: 
i. To evaluate the new NASA "Interim Requirements" provision in 
terms of resulting microbial contamination in finished assemblies , quality 
and reliability of finished assemblies and time, human factor, and economic 
considerations. 
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2. To develop and obtain, for existing and future facilities, design and
 
operational requirements, microbiological monitoring requirements and techni­
ques for fabrication, assembly and test operations and quality assurance re­
quirements and procedures. 
A detailed report on this facility can be found in Drummond and Magis­
trale and Kapell, McDade and Gavin [19, 31]. Microbial and particulate levels 
achieved were well within the specifications of Fed. Std. 209, the Interim 
Requirements and the new NASA document. They report that the hardware 
assembled in EASL appears to have a very low level of contamination. 
Daniel, Mann, Johnson and Mendenhall, under contract t o Jet Propulsion
 
Laboratory, completed in 
 1964 a study of an Assembly Test and Sterilization 
Facility (AT &SF) in which they examined all aspects of assembling and 
sterilizing a spacecraft [36]. They established the following guidelines: 
i. The spacecraft assembly area will be in a clean room. 
2. The material entering the clean room will be surface cleaned with 
ETO, pressurized steam or liquid decontamination agents. 
3. Microbiological monitoring will be conducted within the clean room. 
4. The assembly will be protected from undue contamination by enclos­
ing it in a biological barrier. 
A salient aspect of the facility is the bioassay laboratory with a con­
tinuous biological assay plan. Figures 3 and 4 show the bioassay laboratory 
and petri dish flow plan which have been suggested [19]. 
They report that the design and construction of such a facility is feasible 
and can be constructed from on-the-shelf hardware at reasonable cost, and they 
estimate that a typical Mariner capsule would accumulate around 1. 8 x 106 
viable particles in this facility They recommend further development in the 
areas of automated microbiological assay laboratory devices, improved labor­
atory equipment, smaller and faster air particle counting, better techniques for 
microbial sampling and assay work, improved clean room clothing and headgear 
and additional functional analysis to determine human factors in man/machine 
interfaces in spacecraft sterilization technology. 
In May 1966 Jet Propulsion Laboratory began work in a Sterilization 
and Assembly Development Laboratory (SADL). In this facility experience 
with a full-scale training capsule which is expected to provide necessary know­
ledge for the actual design of a sterilizable spacecraft will be obtained [7, 19, 
36]. 
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General Electric, in conjunction with their pilot spacecraft assembly, 
has converted its controlled environment facility into a bioclean facility. This 
includes a class 100 laminar downflow room and a 67 square meter (722 square 
foot) bioassay laboratory [25]. 
A bioclean room has recently been installed at Goddard Space Flight
 
Center in Greenbelt, Maryland [37].
 
PLANETARY MISSION PLANNING 
Introduction 
The general plan for the sterilization of unmanned planetary landers is as 
follows [22]: 
i. 	 Develop sterilizable capsule hardware. 
2. 	 Limit the quantity of viable biological loading. 
3. 	 Apply terminal sterilization. 
4. 	 Protect the sterile capsule from recontamination through launch and 
and until impact on the planet. (Nominal assembly and sterilization 
procedures for the Voyager capsule are shown in Figure 5 [7]) 
The following paragraphs present a summary of the present status of 
devdlopment in each of these phases, with special emphasis oh the problems in­
volved in each phase. 
Sterilization Compatibility and Reliability 
With the requirement for a sterile Mars landing, sterility joins reliability 
as top priority criteria governing the development of the entire mission. These 
two considerations are not necessarily opposing, but extremely careful planning 
is required to insure the achievement of both, since heating tends to reduce reli­
ability. This involves both the capsule design and the materials used. 
i. Design. - The requirement for sterility must be considered in the
 
design of the capsule. In designing the configuration of the capsule, areas and
 
crevices which may collect contamination should be minimized. The need for
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a clean design is consistent with low particulate contamination and, therefore, 
reliability. A major source of particulate contamination is provided during last 
minute design modifications at the launch site which require machining such as 
drilling. General Electric has examined some of the causes of machine reworking. 
They recommend that sufficient time should be allotted in schedules to permit 
changes to be integrated into the vehicle before it enters the highly controlled 
final assembly area, and that a modular concept be used for equipment packaging 
such that standardized mountings are used for package installation and exchange 
or redesign of equipment requires minimum "dirty" machining [i3]. 
The thermal properties of the vehicle with respect to-a terminal heat 
sterilization cycle must also be considered. Heat sterilization is accompanied 
by two major effects which bear design consideration. These are the effects 
of transient thermal gradients during heat-up and cool-down, and structural 
stresses due to high temperatures. 
The effects of transient thermal gradients are dependent on the rate of 
heating or cooling, the method of heat application and the magnitude of thermal 
resistance paths [38]. Several analyses have been done on similated capsules to 
study heating and cooling phenomena [5, i3, 38, 39]. They show that thermal 
sterilization is an important design criteria. the most recent one reports that 
for a 907-kilogram (2000-pound) lander it may take as long as 400 or 500 hours 
for the innermost parts to reach the temperature of the surface [5]. This ref­
erence reports that the compensating effects of slower heat-up and cool-down of 
internal components essentially equalizes the accumulated sterilization, the 
raximum variation being i0 percent for three locations in any one configuration. 
Presently approved sterilization cycles are based on the assumption that the 
capsule heats and cools instantaneously. For a Voyager capsule of this expected 
size, it appears that this assumption is impractical. Schalhowsky [5] recom­
mends the use of a suitable time-temperature integral over a range of tempera­
tures, which could be implemented by time varying oven cycles so that required 
sterilization with its accompanying deleterious effects would not be greatly ex­
ceeded anywhere. Thus, the thermal conducting properties of materials used 
must be considered in design. 
Structural analyses shows that thermal sterilization is an important 
criterion, particularly in pressure vessels and tanks, pyrotechnics and multi­
layer structures. Analyses on spherical, toroidal and cylindrical liquid or gas 
vessels show that the increased pressure of gases caused by high temperature 
and a 20 percent material degradation allowance imposes a relatively high 
weight penalty (on the order of an 80 weight increase [9]) on tanks which are 
charged before final sterilization [i3]. 
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In summary, some desirable design features of a sterilizable lander 
as listed by General Electric [27] are: 
i. simple geometry for ease of cleaning 
2. design of joints for high thermal conductivity 
3'. avoidance of large concentrated thermal masses 
4. good thermal conductance between heat shield and structure 
5. avoidance of sharp transition from thin to thick structure
 
numbers.
 
6. reduction in the number of alignment sensitive components and 
care in supporting them from major structural cofnponents subject to small 
thermal gradients 
7. special consideration for tanks and pressure vessels because of
 
either weight penalties or need for sterile disconnects
 
8. due regard for the interface problems posed by the need for a 
biological barrier (canister). 
2. Parts and Materials. In present spacecraft technology, many of 
the materials and components are incompatible with the sterilizing conditions 
In general, the ETO-F±2 mixture is more compatible with spacecraft com­
ponents than heat; however, it has been pointed out that any chemical appli­
cations are natural enemies to reliability, and that compared to the large 
store of thermal data, there are relatively few accumulated data on ERO 
mixture effects. Compatibility tests to date, however, show that most 
parts are unaffected by the mixture. Any irreversible. effects on the re­
liability of electronic components appear to be caused by the water vapor 
in the mixture, which has long been known as an enemy to reliability [40]. 
Heat sterilization is destructive to the material and functioning of 
many of the parts currently being used in the spacecraft industry. Besides 
the hope of future development of sterile insertion techniques, there are two 
alternatives for overcoming this obstacle. The first and major one is the 
development of components and materials which can withstand the prolonged 
heating during sterilization; the second is the protection of heat sensitive 
components previously sterilized by other methods. 
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a. Heat sterilizable components and materials. The main 
emphasis is on the development of parts and materials which can withstand 
heat sterilization. In general the most reliable parts are the most likely 
to be sterilizable and the sterilizable components are the most likely to 
be reliable [40]. Developers of heat sterilizable components and materials 
report that the end goal of a totally heat sterilizable lander is feasible. 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory requires that items acceptable to be
 
sterilized by heating for a planetary lander must meet the following
 
specifications [19, 41]:
 
i. Heat Sterilization: Type approval test (nonflight 145*C for
 
36 hours, 3 cycles) (flight acceptance tests to provide sterility, 1350C
 
for 24 hours, i cycle equipment).
 
2. Ethylene Oxide Decontamination: Type approval tests 12
 
percent Ethylene Oxide, 88 percent Freon-12, 24 hours at 250C and 24
 
hours at 400C for two cycles. (40 to 50 percent relative humidity).
 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory is currently involved in a major program to 
establish an approved list of heat sterilizable electronic components and 
do research on all aspects of high temperature, longevity of electronic 
parts, etc. [19]. The present JPL program phase involves 42, 84 
parts made up of 262 part types, and will produce 418 000 000 part-test 
hours of data. The tests include several groups of parts undergoing 
i0 000-hour life testing during and/or after varying numbers of sterili­
zation cycles. This phase of the program will be completed in 1967, and 
a follow up program is planned for the replacement of unapproved parts. 
Work is also being done by JPL and subcontractors on polymeric 
materials and scientific instruments, two of the biggest problem areas. 
Polymeric materials are the least likely to be internally sterilized by 
their manufacturing processes and are the most difficult to assay (see 
previous discussion of assay techniques). The greatest difficulty, how­
ever, is the development of scientific instruments which can be sterilized 
by heating. Developments in the area have met with only limited success. 
Some problem components are sampling devices, plastic seals, lubricants, 
electrodes, dialysis membranes, chemical reagents and biological media; 
many of these are inherently heat labile, and sterilization of these may 
have to depend on methods other than heat, followed by sterile insertion 
or protection from heat during capsule sterilization [i9]. 
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b. Protection of Heat Sensitive Components. The feasibility of 
protecting heat sensitive internal components during sterilization is under 
study by G. E. [13] under contract to NASA. In particular, their work 
covers one passive method, insulation, and one active one, the use of thermo­
electric cooling devices. 
Insulation provides a thermal lag for the component, thus the shortest 
approved sterilization cycle, 160 C for three hours, was used for the study. 
An analysis was done on 7.62-, 10.16- and 15.24-centimeter (3-, 4-, and 
6-inch) cubes having 2.54, 5.08 and 7.62 centimeters (1-, 2-, and, 3-inches) 
of insulation of several thermal diffusivities. They found that the temperature 
reached by the 15.24-centimeter (6-inch) component with 7.62 centimeters 
(3-inches) of the best insulator was the lowest, but that all components 
reached at least 140oC. The weight penalty was of the order of 0.9072 
kilograms (2-pounds) for a 10. 16-centimeter (4-inch) cube with 5.08 
centimeters (2-inches) of insulation. 
Thermoelectric cooling modules take advantage of the temperature 
difference, due to the Peltier effect, which is maintained when direct elec­
trical current is passed through the junction of two dissimilar conductors. 
(The same principle can be used in heating.) This allows for steady-state 
operation with the component at a lower temperature. Factors limiting the 
use of such devices are the difficulty of heat removal to the sterilization 
environment and the fact that thermoelectric modules have a maximum 
allowable hot-side temperature. A theoretical analysis was made of four 
available modules using i05oC to maintain a component at 71*C. None of 
these modules was equal to the task. 
Reduction of Bioload Previous to Terminal Sterilization 
i. Introduction. The terminal sterilization cycles are based on a 
presterilization load of not more than 108 organisms per vehicle. Extensive 
work is currently underway to achieve this with the highest mission reliability 
and the lowest program cost. When methods of monitoring, assaying and 
decontamination become sufficiently refined, it is hoped that the terminal 
sterilization cycles can be reduced, and thus the problems due to the pro­
longed heating of the lander system would be cut down. 
There are three general approaches, which are shown in Figure 6 
[22]. The first permits only one heating and requires bioclean assembly 
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throughout. The second allows normal assembly, heat decontamination of 
assayable parts and subsequent clean assembly. The third allows normal 
manufacturing of subassemblies to a nonassayable size, a " vorst case" 
decontamination cycle and subsequent clean assembly, Monitoring of pro­
cedures by visual means, air sampling and biological fallout strips will be 
required in all clean assembly steps. Reliability factors will probably de­
termine the final choice [22]. 
2. Piece Parts. G. E. has recently completed an experimental 
evaluation of detailed manufacturing procedures and parts procurement 
[27]. In general it is recommended that piece parts be manufactured 
under normal conditions and then sterilized or decontaminated before in­
corporation into subassemblies. Many parts manufacturing procedures 
involve heat curing cycles such that with only minor modifications they 
can be altered to yield internally sterile parts. 
3. Subsystems. 
a. Procurement. Prime contractors obtain much of their 
hardware from subcontractors. On a recent program General Electric 
reports [27] that subcontracting represented 60 percent of total hardware 
cost and 35 percent of hardware items. This means that larger items 
were bought, and smaller items were made by the prime contractor. 
This presents the problem of educating suppliers of major subassemblies 
in bioclean assembly techniques. General Electric. has conducted surveys 
to evaluate vendor requirements, and they find that this may be a major 
problem. 
NASA is currently sponsoring a series of training courses for pro­
fessional technical workers to familiarize them with microbiology. The 
course is entitled "Environmental Microbiology for Engineers," and the 
University of Minnesota is giving the course. 
b. Assembly. Starting at the subsystem level, according to the 
Voyager Quarantine Plan [ 7] the various developmental contractors will be 
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required to assemble hardware in a certified Planetary Quarantine Clean 
Assembly Facility, with appropriate monitoring. In studying actual assembly 
procedure in their pilot spacecraft assembly, however, G. E. has compared 
various cleaning and decontamination techniques, and found that comparable 
low levels of biological contamination can be achieved in many cases, without 
the use of expensive clean rooms, by incorporating minor changes into the 
standard assembly procedures. General Electric has issued, in conjunction 
with the final report on this phase of their contract [27], a Procedures 
Manual Volume. I, Manufacturing Procedures, [14 which details these 
procedures.
 
Sterile assembly as a practical alternative to total heat sterilization 
was experimentally evaluated by Lockheed [26]. They carried out the as­
sembly of a small electronics unit in a glove box under sterile atmospheres 
of nitrogen, Ethylene Oxide-Freon 12 and air. They found that maintenance 
of sterility throughout aseptic assembly is feasible, but that the effectiveness 
of ETO in sterilizing some of the typical components was not demonstrated. 
In general, although specifications require assembly in clean rooms 
to maintain a reduced bioload, this involves a large time, cost and personnel 
penalty. G.E. recommends the use of normal aerospace conditions whenever 
possible, followed by decontamination. This trend is also evidenced in a paper 
from AVCO [42] in which a method of calculating total bioload for analytical 
comparison of assembly techniques is presented. They report that required 
levels of biological contamination can be achieved without the-requirement 
that parts and components to be delivered to the capsule system assembly 
contractor be produced under other than normal conditions. 
4. Packaging and Storage. Storage of nonclean assembled parts at
 
elevated temperatures for a relatively long period has been considered for
 
bioload reduction [27]. For example, storage at i050C for two weeks
 
(336 hours) is the same as one of the sterilization cycles. This would
 
constitute decontamination, rather than sterilization, since it is not assumed
 
that the original bioload is particularly low.
 
Packaging materials for sterility and biocleanliness maintenance are 
being investigated [27]. Present conclusions indicate that due to the many 
properties necessary--sterilizability, cleanability, slough resistance, heat 
sealability, transparency and permeability only to ETO -- a combination of 
materials will probably be used. 
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5. Final Assembly. Final assembly before sterilization will be done 
in a Class 100 vertical laminar downflow cleanroom [7, 22, 27, and 29]. 
Launch Site Flow andTerminal Sterilization 
i. Introduction. Since the final assembly is to result in a relatively 
low level of biological contamination, it is recommended [27] that the lander 
be transported to the~launch site sealed in its canister which is in turn sealed 
inside a shipping container. A positive pressure inside the canister is to be 
maintained and can be monitored to insure the integrity of the canister as a 
bacteriological barrier. Upon arrival at the launch site, it will be inspected 
in a bioclean area, in order to maintain the low bioload. 
Sterilization heat cycles have been discussed in Section II. Analytical 
studies have shown that heating by convection of an inert gas is more efficient 
than heating in a vacuum. The present state of the art requires that a term­
inal sterilization heat cycle is applied to the completely assembled lander in­
side its canister, which is then sealed. 
The method of implementing the terminal launch-site sterilization 
cycle is being studied [27, 36]. Several typical launch site flow plans have 
been proposed; a specific one cannot be made until an actual mission is de­
signed. Previous sterilization plans have been proposed by G. E. in 1963 
[15] and Daniel, Mann, Johnson and Mendenhall under contract to JPL in 
1964 [19]. 
2. Present Sterilization Plan. In conformance with the sterili­
zation technology in 1965, the Voyager 1973 design has the following basic 
ground rules [.27]: 
i. bioclean assembly at the contractor's plant 
2. terminal sterilization at the launch site 
3. launch by Saturn V Booster. 
31 
Critical aspects of the launch site flow plan are: 
a. Ordinance Installation. Due to the closed nature of the 
lander-canister system, a significant portion of measuring devices will 
have to be installed before systems test, because later installation would 
require disassembly of the vehicle, thereby negating the results of the 
systems test. 
b. Launch Pad Compatibility Tests. It is recommended that 
launch site compatibility tests be performed either with a development 
vehicle or with A flight backup vehicle in order to eliminate one trip to and 
from the Vehicle Assembly Building, eliminate an extra mechanical and 
electrical mating and stage separation and eliminate a significant amount 
of time in the Vehicle Assembly Building. 
This is significant from a contamination control viewpoint, too; the 
only disadvantage is that the test would not be on the specific vehicle. Since 
the vehicles are to be identical, however, this is not considered to be a 
serious disadvantage. 
c. Saturn V Considerations. The goal of restraints from 
this consideration is to delay mating with the Saturn V as long as possible 
to minimize the time between sterilization of the lander and launch [27]. 
During the last time that the canister and lander are separated, the 
lander is to be bioassayed for the last time. G.E. has developed an ap­
proach for estimating the total bioload, based in their pilot spacecraft 
assembly. This approach involves the estimation of the total surface area 
and allows calculation of total bioload. The method also permits the allo­
cation of contamination levels to various components during subassembly 
to achieve a specific final level, and permits extrapolation with respect 
to vehicle size. 
d. Possible Future Sterilization Plan. Although no methods 
of sterile assembly have been approved by NASA to date (July 1966), the 
use of an Assembly/Sterilizer, shown in Figure 8, has been proposed by 
G. E. and is under investigation [43]. This facility provides for sterile 
operations on the spacecraft before and after sterilization. The decon­
taminated vehicle is placed in the facility, disassembled, sterilized and 
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then reassembled by workers topologically separated from the sterile en­
vironment by bioisolator suits. Repairs can be made, or replacement 
parts can be brought in and sterilized in pass-through chambers. Another 
advantage would be the minimization of the thermal structural problems 
discussed in an earlier section by sterilization in a disassembled state 
and separate sterilization of liquids, gases and pyrotechnics. Use of this 
facility would allow for a simplified canister design and would allow placing 
a sterile bag over the canister. NASA has not yet (as of July 1966) approved 
any sterile assembly methods, but the feasibility of this facility is presently 
being investigated by General Electric under contract NASI-538i [27, 43, 44]. 
Sterility Maintenance After Terminal Sterilization 
i. Before Launch. After sterilization, the lander is sealed in a 
biological barrier to maintain its sterility until impact on the planet. General 
design criteria for the canister are as follows [27]: 
i. Keep out bacteria, spores, and other organisms. 
2. Keep the canister as light as possible, since it accompanies
 
the lander into space.
 
3. Be able to contain the capsule and any remote handling gear. 
4. Incorporate sterile electrical connectors for flight, checkout, 
and test. 
5. May act as a meteroid bumper if weight penalty can be tolerated, 
and if retained until just before planetary entry. 
6. Contain sterile plumbing fittings for liquids and gases, if
 
required.
 
7. Remain unaffected by hot or cold (Ethylene Oxide-Freon Ff2) 
sterilization methods. 
8. Remain unaffected by dry heat up to i45C. 
9. Eject the capsule before planetary entry without compromising 
sterility. 
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The selection of materials, rigid or flexible, depends on the size 
and shape of the lander. It has been recommended [39] that rigid canisters 
be used for small landers and that a combination rigid and flexible structure 
be used for larger vehicles. 
Prevention of canister penetration by microorganisms will be imple­
mented by maintenance of a 6894 newtoi per square centimeter (i psi) posi­
tive pressure iniside the canister, so that any leaks will be outward. This 
will aiso provide an easy way to monitor the integrity of the canister. 
The AVCO Corporation has recently completed a contract to design, 
fabricate and test a rigid container for a 76. 2-centimeter (30-inch) -diameter 
sphere-cone atmospheric probe, and to evaluate its effectiveness as a bio­
logical barrier after exposure to qualification level sterilization heat cycles. 
Areas of interest in this study were barrier integrity, thermal gradients, 
thermal stresses, effects of different types of pressurizing gas and effects 
of free and forced convection heat transfer on the system [451. They 
report that existing technology will enable the desigi and fabrication of such 
a canister.
 
2. After Launch. Detailed-analysis is required to prevent the 
contamination of the lander after launch and contamination of the planet 
from accidental impact of contaminated parts of the launch vehicle or 
canister. Some tentative contamination probability assignments have 
been discussed in the second section of this report. Contamination sources 
include penetration of the canister during flight, recontamination from vari­
ous sources at the time of lander deployment froni the canister and 
accidental impact on the surface of lander or planet by spacecraft ejecta 
such as attitude control gas, material outgassing and propulsion system 
gasses. A more complete outline of possible sources of contamination 
can be found in JPL is Planetary Quarantine Plan [7]. 
The canister development contract by AVCO includes a study and 
analysis of deployment mechanisms with respect to contamination. 
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CONCLUS IONS AN D RECOMMENDATIONS
 
It appears that present technology will be able to provide, as mission 
development requires, the capability to land reliably a sterile vehicle on 
another planet; the obstacles are tremendous, however,, and a concentrated 
effort in adl areas of planning, engineering hanufacturing and assembly is re­
qhired. Technology for the implementation of a planetary quarantine policy it 
expanding very rapidly around mission guidelines which are themselves in 
developmental stages. This presents the potential hazard that mission guide­
lines may be adopted that are not necessarily the best consistent with existing 
technology in terms of reliability, cost and overall mission objectives. An 
example of this is the possible rejection of the inflight sterilization concept 
because it was suggested after plans around the terminal heat sterilization 
concept were well underwray. For optimum achievement of the goals of in­
terplanetary missions, it is recommended that maximum flexibility in funda­
mental policy as well as all other planning phases be maintained. 
REC D~I G PAG E LA N',KNO T JIL,,, I)' 37 
REFEREN CES
 
i. 	 Anon.: Significant Achievements in.Space Biosciences 1958-1964. 
NASA SP-92, 1966. 
2. 	 Anon.: NASA Unmanned Spacecraft, Decontamination Policy. NASA 
Management Manual, no. 4-4-1, ch. 4, Sept. 9, 1963. 
3. 	 Personal communication with Dr. Carl Bruch, NASA Headquarters, 
August 1966. 
4. 	 Sagan, C. and Coleman, S.: Spacecraft Sterilization Standards and 
Contamination of Mars. Aeronaut. Astron. , May 1965. 
5. 	 Schalhowsky, Samuel (Principal investigator): Study of Analytical 
Techniques in Dry Heat Steriization-of Planetary Spacecraft. Exotech 
Inc., Third Monthly Progress Report, Jan. 20, 1966. 
6. 	 Light, J. 0. : Discussion of Planetary Quarantine Constraints. 
Presented at COSPAR (Vienna), May ii-i8, 1966. 
7. 	 Anon.: Planetary Quarantine Plan. JPL PQ 001 BB 001 lE51, 
Mar. 15, 1966. 
8. 	 Fisher, Pearl D. : Evaluation of the Feasibility of In-Flight Sterili­
zation of Mars'Probes. Presented at Stepping Stones to.Mars 
AIAA Meeting (Baltimore, Maryland), March 29, 1966. 
9. 	 Anon. : Procedures Manual for Planetary Spacecraft to be Sterilized 
by Heating, Volume I, Design Guidelines. General Electric Co., 
July 31, 1965. 
10. 	 Opfell, J. B. and Newman, T. W. : A System Engineering Approach 
to Spacecraft Sterilization Requirements. Presented at Stepping 
Stones to Mars Meeting of AIAA (Baltimore), March 29, 1966. 
ii. 	 Barrett, M. J. and Cooley, W. C. : On the Feasibility of Radiation 
Sterilization of Planetary Spacecraft. Exotech Inc., Final Report, 
NASA Contract NASW-i320, May 2, 1966. 
PRECEDING PAGE CLANK NOT FILMED. 39 
REFERENCES (Cont'd) 
12. 	 Portner, D. M.; Spinner, D. R.; Hoffman, R. K.; and Phillips, C. R.: 
Effect of Ultrahigh Vacuum on Viability of Micro-organisms. Science, 
vol. 134, no. 3495, 1961, p. 2047. 
13. 	 Anon.: Design Criteria for Typical Mars Landing Capsules Requiring 
Sterilization. General Electric Co. First Quarterly Progress Report, 
Phase III, NASA Contract NAS8-ii372, Apr. 1, 1966. 
14.' 	 Anon.: Procedures Manual for Planetary Spacecraft to be Sterilized 
by Heating, Volume II, Manufacturing Procedures. General Electric 
Co., Preliminary, July 5, 1966. 
15. 	 Anon.: Voyager Design Study, Volume V Sterilization. General 
Electric Co., NASA Contract NASW-696, Oct. 15, 1963. 
6. Anon. : Handbook for Contamination Control on the Apollo Program. 
General Electric Co. (Draft) ASD-QA-12-65-6, NASA Contract 
NASW-410, Dec. 1, 1965. 
17. 	 Anon.: Russian Sterilization Report. Contamination Control, Amer­
ican Association for Contamination Control, volume V, no. 7, 
July 1966. 
18. 	 Decker, H. M. and Buchanan, L. M. : Filtration in Spacecraft 
Sterilization. Presented at NASA First National Conference on 
Spacecraft Sterilization Technology (Pasadena, California), 
Nov. 16-iS, 1965. 
19. 	 Drummond, D. and Magistrale V. (Compilers): JPL Spacecraft 
Sterilization Technology Program: A Progress Report. Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory TR-32-853, Dec. 31, 1965. 
20. 	 Opfell, John B. and Bandaruk, W.: Microbial Contaminants in the 
Interiors of Spacecraft Components. (Philco) COSPAR, Sixth 
International Space Science Symposium (Buenos Aires, Argentina), 
May 1965. 
40 
REFERENCES (Cont'd) 
21. 	 Kohorst, D. P. and Harvey, H. : Polymers for Sterilized Spacecraft. 
Presented at NASA First National Conference on Spacecraft Sterilization 
Technology (Pasadena, California), Nov. ±6-18, 1965. 
22. 	 Hall, Lawrence B.: NASA Requirements for the Sterilization of Space­
craft. Presented at the First Annual National Conference on Space­
craft Sterilization (Pasadena, California), Nov. 6-18, 1965. 
23. 	 Memorandum from Dr. Reynolds to 0. W. Nicks, Director of Lurr 
and Planetary Programs, May 26, 1966. 
24. 	 Anon. : Standard Procedures for the Microbiological Examination of 
Space Hardware. NASA Headquarters, Washington, D. C., June i, 
1966.
 
25. 	 Anon.: A Proposal for a Handbook on the Biological Aspects of 
Spacecraft Sterilization. General Electric Co., Mar. 14, 1966. 
26. 	 Anon. : Experimental Study of Sterile Assembly Techniques. Lockheed 
Missile and Space Co. , Final Report, Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
Contract No. JPL 950993. 
27. 	 Anon.: Development of Manufacturing Procedures for Planetary 
Spacecraft to be Sterilized by Heating, First (5 August 1965), 
Second (5 November ±965), and Third (5 March 1966) Quarterly 
Progress and Final Report, General Electric Co., Phase II NASA 
Contract NA8-ii372, July 19, 1966. 
28. 	 Anon.: Standard Bioclean Room and Work Station Requirements 
for the Microbiologically Controlled Environment. NASA Head­
quarters, Washington, D. C., Preliminary Draft. 1966. 
29. 	 Clean Room and Work Station Requirements, Controlled Envron­
ment. Fed. Std. 209. Dec. 16, 1963. 
41 
REFERENCES (Cont'd) 
30. 	 Beyerle, F. J. and Lorsch, H. G.: Manufacturing and Handling Pro­
cedures for Planetary Spacecraft to be Sterilized by Heating. Presented 
at First Annual National Conference on Spacecraft Sterilization Tech­
nology (Pasadena, California), Nov. i6-iS, 1965. 
31. 	 Kapell, G. F.; McDade, J. J.; and Gavin, T. R.: Experimental 
Assembly and Sterilization Laboratory (EASL) Operations: Phase I. 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory TR-32-941, Apr. 15, 1966. 
32. 	 Anthony, H. V. ; Drew, J. G. ; La Rue, E. F. ; and McDonald, J. P.: 
Study of Contamination Sensors. Volume II, Final Technical Report, 
NASA Contract NASiO-2692, Martin-Marietta Co., Apr. 1966. 
IITRI, 
Final Report for NASA Contract NAS8-2053i, July i, 1966. 
33. 	 Anon.: Fabrication of Particle Counters for Clean Rooms. 
34. 	 Anon.: Particulate Matter Challenge for a Validation of the Main­
tenance of Sterility within a Sterile Assembly System. McDonnell 
Aircraft Corp., Unsolicited Proposal, Jan. 17, 1966. 
35. 	 Magistrale, V. J. : Engineering Problems in Capsule Sterilization. 
Astronaut. Aeron., vol. 4, no. 2, February 1966. 
36. 	 Daniel; Mann; Johnson; and Mendenhall: Preliminary Engineering 
Report For Sterile Assembly Development Laboratory. Performed 
for Jet Propulsion Laboratory, June 1965. 
37. 	 Anon.: Standard Operating Procedures - Experimental Clean Assembly 
and Sterilization Laboratory. Melpar, NASA Contract NAS5-87i8, 
July 1966. 
38. 	 Tenney, J. B., Jr. ; Fried, E. ; and Crawford R. G. : Thermal 
Sterilization of Spacecraft Structures. Presented at ALA.A Un­
manned Spacecraft Meeting (Los Angeles, California), Mar. 
1-4, 1965. 
42 
REFERENCES (Concluded) 
39. 	 Anon. : Design Criteria for Typical Planetary Spacecraft to be 
Sterilized by Heating. Final Report, Phase I, vol. I, General 
Electric Co., NASA Contract No. NAS8-i1372, Dec. 15, 1965. 
40. 	 Bartholomew, C. S. and Porter D. C.: Reliability and Sterili­
zation. Boeing Co., Presented at Stepping Stones to Mars Meeting 
of AIAA, (Baltimore), Mar. 29, 1966. 
41. 	 Anon. : Environmental Specification Voyager Capsule Flight Equip­
ment and Flight Acceptance Test Procedures for the Heat Sterili­
zation and Ethylene Oxide Decontamination Environments. JPL 
Spec. vol. 50503-ETS, Jan. 12, 1966. 
42. 	 Botan, E.; Gautrand, J. A.; Rider, T. and Schafer, W. J.: 
Biological Burden Estimation of Mars Probes and Capsules and a 
Method of Burden Control. AVCO, Presented at Stepping Stones 
to Mars Meeting of AIAA (Baltimore) Mar. 29, 1966. 
43. 	 Anon. : A Program to Demonstrate the Feasibility of an Assembly/
Sterilizer Facility. General Electric, Unsolicited Proposal sub­
mitted to NASA Headquarters. Nov. 6, 1964. 
44. 	 Crawford, J. G. and Zanks, J. F.: The Assembly/Sterilizer 
-
A Facility for the Sterilization and Assembly of Spacecraft. 
G. E., Presented at Stepping Stones to Mars Meeting of AAA 
(Baltimore), March 29, ±966. 
45. 	 Anon.: Development of a Typical Mars Landing Capsule 
Sterilization Container. Final Report, AVCO Corp., NASA Con­
tract No. NAS8-20502, June 28, 1966. 
43 
BIBLIOGRAPHY
 
i. 	 Opfell; Miller; Kovar; Nutin; and Allen: Sterilization Handbook. 
Final Report, Dynamic Science Corp., NASA Contract No. NASW-777, 
Aug. 26, 1964. 
2. 	 Anon.: A Study of Design Guideline for Sterilization of Spacecraft

Structure. Final Report, General Electric Co., 
 NASA Contract No. 
NAS8-lilO7, Aug. 1964. 
3. 	 Thomas, Fred W., Jr. and Bergson, Myron H. : Maintaining
Environmental Control Requirements for Fabrication and Assembly
of Sterile Space Vehicles. General Electric Co. ,. Institute of 
Environment Sciences 1965 Annual Technical Meeting Proceedings. 
4. 	 Nowitsky, A. M. : Spacecraft Sterilization Techniques and Equip­
ment. Johnson Publishing Company, 1965.
 
5. 	 Michaelson, G. B. : The Bacteriology of Clean Rooms. Progress
Report WSG-643, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 
1, Oct. 1964- Mar. 31, 1965. 
6. 	 Nicks, 0. W. and Miles, J. R. : Some Developments in Sterilization 
for Planetary Probes. Presented to COSPAR (Buenos Aires, 
Argentina), May 19, 1965. 
7. 	 Portner, D. M.: Dry Heat Sterilization of Micro-organisms at 
±05* F. Protection Branch Report of Test No. 19-65, Fort Detrick, 
Md, June 7, 1965. 
8. 	 Montgomery, L. C. and Marsh, H. E., Jr.: Sterilized Solid-
Propellant Rocket Motors for Mars Landing Missions. Revision 
1, Jet Propulsion Laboratory TR 32-725, June 30, 1965. 
9. 	 Tenney, J. B., Jr.and Crawford, R. G.: Design Requirements for 
the Sterilization Containers of Planetary Landers. AIAA paper
65-387, Presented at AIAA Second Annual Meeting, July 26-29, 
1965. 
44 
BIBLIOGRAPHY (Contd) 
10. 	 Anon.: Standards and Guidelines for the Design and Operation of Clean 
Rooms and Clean Work Stations. U. S. Air Force Technical Order 
T. 0. 00-25-203, Aug. 3i, 1965. 
ii. 	 Edelstein, L. and LeVora, N. W. : Sterilization of Spacecraft and 
Equipment. Martin Co., Presented at American Ordinance Asso­
ciation Seminar on Aerospace Packaging (Aberdeen Proving Ground), 
Sept. 29, 1965. 
2. 	 Powers, E. M.: Microbical Profile of Laminar Flow Clean Room.
 
Goddard Space Flight Center, X-600-65-308, Sept. 1965.
 
13. 	 Keister, F. Z. : Determination of the Effects of a Thermal Steri­
lization Process on the Mechanical and Electrical Properties of 
Soldered and Welded Joint. Hughes Final Report on Contract No. 
951069 for Jet Propulsion Laboratory, subcontracted under NASA 
Contract No. NAS7-100, Oct. 9, 1965. 
14, 	 Terry, John E. : Sterilization of Unmanned Planetary Spacecraft. 
Document RSIC-490, Nov. 15, 1965. 
15. 	 Proceedings, NASA National Conference on Spacecraft Steriliza­
tion, Technology (Pasadena, California), Nov. 16-18, 1965, 
(in press). 
16. 	 Quarterly Status Report. U. S. Army Biological Center 
(Provisional) Fort Detrick, Maryland, NASA Contract No. 
R-35, Nov. 1, 1965 - Feb. 1, 1966. 
7. 	 Life in Extraterrestrial Environments. Quarterly Status Report
 
IITRI, NASA Contract No. NASr-22, Feb. i5, 1966.
 
18. 	 Sterilization. A selected Bibliography from the Literature 
Retrieval System, -Space Biology Branch, Goddard Space Flight 
Center Report X-450-66-53, Mar. 1966, (latest reference -
Jan. i985­
5 
B I B LIOGRAPHY (Concluded) 
9. 	 Hall, Lawrence B. : Sterilizing Space Probes. International Science 
and Technology, Apr. 1966. 
20. 	 Stambler, Irwin: Mariner/Voyager: A New Fix on Mars. Space/ 
Aeronautics, May 1966. 
February 1, 1967 DISTRIBUTION 
Marshall Space Flight Center R-ME-M 
DIR R-ME-MMC 
B-DIR Mr. F. J. Beyerle (24) 
R-ME-MM 
I"DIR 
R-P&VE-DIR 
R-ME-RE (6) 
MS-IL 
R-RP-DIR 
MS-IP 
R-AS-V 
Mr. R. Crawford 
R-ASTR-M 
Mr. W. Kaspareck 
R-EO-DIR 
R-EO-R 
Mr. H. Coons 
R-QUAL-DIR 
R-QUAL-AMS 
Mr. M. Pickard 
R-ME-DIR 
R-ME-T 
R-ME-D 
R-ME-DP 
R-ME-A 
R-ME-P 
F. J. Beyerle 
R-ME-MMC 
47 
